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A DEWEYAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 
Margaret Jane Radin* 
INTRODUCTION 
The economic theory of democracy, otherwise known as 
public choice theory, applies the postulates and reasoning of eco-
nomics to politics and constitutions. "The basic behavioral pos-
tulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an 
egoistic, rational, utility maximizer."1 The basic methodological 
premise, as for economics, is a rigorous atomistic individualism. 
The basic moral stance, as for much of economics, is that this is 
"positive" theory, unconcerned with the goodness or badness of 
political actors and institutions, but only seeking to observe how 
incentives and institutional structures interact to produce empiri-
cal consequences. 
For the functioning of democratic institutions-legislatures, 
administrative bodies, courts-the main predicted empirical con-
sequence of all this individual maximization behavior by political 
actors-legislators, administrators, judges-is that there is mas-
sive rent-seeking going on. (Rent-seeking, in the parlance of pub-
lic choice, means manipulating wealth transfers away from the 
unorganized public in favor of well-organized interest groups.) 
Public choice theorists use two different aspects of scientific 
methodology, which I can characterize as deductive and induc-
tive, to study these phenomena. In deductive research, public 
choice theorists use formal models to derive in detail exactly how 
we should see all this profit-seeking do its work on various as-
pects of the body politic. In inductive research, they use statisti-
cal analysis of data to collate the details of how the profit-seeking 
postulate fits the facts of democratic institutions, their process 
and output. 
Public choice theory presents a bleak picture for any san-
guine believer in high school civics. Instead of commitment to 
* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. This essay was originally delivered as 
the Dewey Lecture on November 11, 1993 at the University of Minnesota Law School. 
1. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 1 (Cambridge U. Press, 1979). 
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dialogue, deliberation, and ideals of public betterment, politi-
cians are committed to collecting as much campaign money as 
possible so that they can be re-elected. In this bleak picture vot-
ing is paradoxical because it is an irrational act, economically 
speaking. Maybe votes are just commodities that are bought by 
interest groups for politicians "in exchange for higher probability 
of seeing a favorite bill passed."2 
Whether public choice theory is a good or useful way to look 
at politics is disputed. As a land use teacher, I can say that the 
model seems to describe pretty well many of the interactions be-
tween developers and local planning and zoning officials. But if 
this is the truth about politics, what should we make of the ideal 
of deliberative self-government? What should we make of the 
ideal of a polity whose whole is more than the sum of its parts? 
Must we conclude that these ideals are merely obfuscatory rheto-
ric, used only because such rhetoric is welfare-maximizing for 
some powerful group? 
I have been wondering what a Deweyan would make of pub-
lic choice theory. From what we know of John Dewey's views of 
democracy, what is it plausible to imagine he might say if a time 
machine could bring him to our present? In this essay I'm going 
to speculate rather freely on that question. At first glance it 
might seem that Dewey's passionate commitment to the ideal of 
liberal deliberative self-government would make him dismiss 
public choice theory as anathema. Yet I think the question is 
interestingly more complex. As you will see, I imagine that 
Dewey would approve of the impulse to find a scientific ap-
proach to explain and predict the consequences of various fea-
tures of human incentive structures and institutional design; but I 
also imagine he would think public choice analysis sadly mistakes 
the contingent nonideal situation we find ourselves in for a set of 
immutable laws; and I think he would find it important to con-
sider the feedback into cultural evolution of this way of conceiv-
ing of our political process. 
I. DEWEYAN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: IDEAL AND 
NONIDEAL 
A. DEMOCRACY AS IDEAL AND METHOD 
In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey drew a distinction 
between "democracy as a social idea" and "political democracy 
2. Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislolion, 74 Va. L. Rev. 339, 364 
(1988). 
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as a system of government. "3 Democracy as a social idea is a 
regulative ideal of self-actualization in all aspects of social life. I 
will call this ideal democracy. Commitment to it is a moral com-
mitment, and Dewey often refers to it as a faith, a creed. By 
contrast, political democracy as a system of government is the set 
of institutional mechanisms by which we hope to realize the so-
cial idea. I will call this nonideal democracy, or democracy-as-we-
know-it. Dewey warns that the two must not be conflated. Criti-
cism of existing democratic government (the nonideal) does not 
"touch the social and moral aspirations and ideas which underlie 
the political forms"(the ideal).4 Dewey says we should clarify 
and deepen our apprehension of the ideal, and use this deeper 
understanding to "criticize and remake its political 
manifestations. "s 
How does Dewey define the democratic ideal? First, from 
the standpoint of the individual, "it consists in having a responsi-
ble share according to capacity in forming and directing the activ-
ities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating 
according to need in the values which the groups sustain. "6 Sec-
ond, from the standpoint of the groups, "it demands liberation of 
the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the 
interests and goods which are common."? Third, "[s)ince every 
individual is a member of many groups, this specification cannot 
be fulfilled except when different groups interact flexibly and 
fully in connection with other groups."s This "free give-and-
take" makes "fullness of integrated personality possible of 
achievement. "9 Dewey disavows the traditional dichotomy be-
tween individual and social values: self-constitution is only possi-
ble within a group. Indeed, the democratic ideal is nothing other 
than "the idea of community life itself. "to 
One reason groups are essential to individual self-develop-
ment is that only in groups do we possess language and engage in 
communication; indeed, as Dewey argued in Experience and Na-
ture, only in groups can we have mind and consciousness.u 
Groups allow us to make progress in knowledge by preserving 
previously acquired wisdom and tools and by allowing new in-
3. John C. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 143 (Gateway Books, 1946). 
4. ld. at 143-44. 
5. Id. at 144. 
6. ld. at 147. 
7. Id. 
8. ld. 
9. ld. at 148. 
10. Id. 
11. John C. Dewey, Experience and Nature (Dover Pubs., 1958). 
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sights and methods to be widely shared; and it is progress in 
knowledge which enables us to get closer to the democratic ideal 
of full development of human capacities. Thus there is a close 
connection between knowledge and democracy.tz 
A problem for democracy, then, is how to make all our vari-
ous splintered interests and groups into one community in the 
sense requisite for progress in knowledge and full development 
of human capacities. It is clear at least that certain things are 
needed: unobstructed, genuine communication; open-ended ex-
perimental method; education and culture-creation to make 
these possible.n So the democratic ideal entails a democratic 
method. Dewey argued in Freedom and Culture that "demo-
cratic ends demand democratic methods for their realization. "14 
An "obvious requirement" if the democratic ideal is to be ful-
filled is "freedom of social inquiry and of distribution of its con-
clusions."ts Freedom of social inquiry in tum requires freedom 
of expression, and, if it is to achieve any success in adding to the 
store of shared knowledge, "full publicity in respect to all conse-
quences" which concern the public.t6 Precise knowledge of the 
factual details which are the consequences of social activity is 
needed, as well as willingness to try alternatives in order to alter 
the consequences. In other words, Dewey says, what is required 
is social inquiry that exactly parallels modem scientific inquiry. 
Thus, an experimental or scientific method as applied to so-
cial problems is the method of democracy. Dewey refers to this 
method of free inquiry as the method of "organized intelli-
gence,"t7 the "procedure of organized cooperative inquiry."ts 
We must use it to create a culture in which free inquiry is fea-
tured. In order to make this method part of our social life we 
require education in its use, and hence Dewey's deep concern 
with education. The culture that is needed to produce and sup-
port the method of cooperative inquiry is humanistic culture. 
Thus, Dewey says, "democracy means the belief that humanistic 
culture should prevail"t9 The humanist view of democracy "tells 
us that we need to examine every one of the phases of human 
activity" -culture in general, education, science, art, morals, reli-
12. Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1671 (1990). 
13. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems at ch. V (cited in note 3). 
14. John C. Dewey, Freedom and Culture 133 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939). 
15. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems at 166 (cited in note 3). 
16. ld. at 167. 
17. John C. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action 79 (Capricorn, 1963). 
18. Id. at 71. 
19. Dewey, Freedom and Culture at 97 (cited in note 14). 
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gion, industry and politics-"to ascertain what effects it has in 
release, maturing and fruition of the potentialities of human 
nature. "2o 
B. DEMOCRACY IN PRAcriCE: THE NoNIDEAL 
Dewey was passionately committed to the democratic ideal. 
But he was also a passionate critic of democracy-as-we-know-it, 
political democracy in practice. He viewed our institutions of 
government, and our society as a whole, as falling far short of the 
democratic ideal. Many of his criticisms seem apt today as well. 
In Liberalism and Social Action, Dewey outlined a "crisis in 
liberalism," connected with "failure to develop and lay hold of an 
adequate conception of intelligence integrated with social move-
ments. . . . "21 This is in large part a failure of social science, 
which has not matured to the point where it can improve our 
day-to-day existence; it has not developed to parallel physical sci-
ence. Whereas "every discovery in physical knowledge signified 
... a change in the processes of production," because "there are 
countless persons whose business it is to see that these discover-
ies take effect" in practical operations, there is "next to nothing 
of the same sort with respect to knowledge of man and human 
affairs."22 Thus, "[t]he prime condition of a democratically or-
ganized public is a kind of knowledge and insight which does not 
yet exist. "23 
Cooperative experimental intelligence as applied to human 
affairs is the systematic exploration of how to achieve human 
flourishing within a culture and community. According to 
Dewey, our approach to education reflects the primitive state of 
our grasp of this method. Science is taught in school as simply 
another subject, where it "signifies one more opportunity for the 
mechanization of the material and methods of study."24 In 
contrast, 
[i]f it were treated as what it is, the method of intelligence 
itself in action, then the method of science would be incarnate 
in every branch of study and every detail of learning. Thought 
would be connected with the possibility of action, and every 
mode of action would be reviewed to see its bearing upon the 
habits and ideas from which it sprang.25 
20. Id. at 97-98. 
21. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action at 44 (cited in note 17). 
22. ld. at 46. 
23. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems at 166 (cited in note 3). 
24. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action at 47 (cited in note 17). 
25. Id. at 46-47. 
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Partly because of our undeveloped approach to education, 
Dewey argued, the needed widespread cultural commitment to 
the scientific attitude does not exist. For the same reason, the 
kind of genuine communication we would need in order to un-
derstand the consequences of social action and to increase shared 
knowledge of the effectiveness of various social tools also does 
not exist. 
Rapid progress in communications technology might have 
provided an opportunity for real cooperative interchange and 
augmentation of knowledge; instead, Dewey said, we have a 
flood of propaganda and a concomitant skepticism about voting 
and the process of govemment.26 A large percentage of voters 
doesn't bother to vote at all, and people think their vote doesn't 
matter, doesn't change anything. Politics is dominated by fac-
tions (parties) run by machines. The public is unorganized and 
diffuse. According to Dewey, the theory that elected representa-
tives are responsible to the electorate has broken down; it works 
best in describing politicians' behavior in response to local pres-
sure groups.27 
Likewise our process of formation of social policies in legis-
lation reflects our lack of grasp of the method of intelligence, 
which is the democratic method. According to Dewey, the dem-
ocratic method exerts far less force in politics than do "the inter-
est of individuals and parties in capturing and retaining office 
and power," and "the propaganda of publicity agents," and "or-
26. Because of passages like the following, I can imagine how Dewey would respond 
to sound bites and Ronald Reagan's style of communication-and its spectacular success. 
(Instead of making things better with TV, telephones, computers, and the coming vide-
ophones and interactive networks, we have made them worse.) 
No intelligent observer can deny, I think, that [symbols] are often used in party 
politics as a substitute for realities instead of as means of contact with them .... 
That which we term education has done a good deal to generate habits that put 
symbols in the place of realities. The forms of popular government make neces-
sary the elaborate use of words to influence political action. "Propaganda" is 
the inevitable consequence of the combination of these influences and it extends 
to every area of life. Words not only take the place of realities but are them-
selves debauched. Decline in the prestige of suffrage and of parliamentary gov-
ernment are intimately associated with the belief, manifest in practice even if not 
expressed in words, that intelligence is an individual possession to be reached by 
means of verbal persuasion. 
Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action at 72 (cited in note 17). 
27. It is at least suggestive that the terms of the theory [of the responsibility of 
elected representatives] are best met in legislation o~ the "pork-barrel" type. 
There a representative may be called to account for failure to meet local desire, 
or be rewarded for pertinacity and success in fulfilling its wishes. . . . The reason 
for the lack of personal liability to the electorate is evident. The latter is com-
posed of rather amorphous groups. Their political ideas and beliefs are mostly 
in abeyance between elections. 
Dewey, The Public and Its Problems at 121-22 (cited in note 3). 
1994-95] DEWEYAN PERSPECTWE 545 
ganized pressure groups."28 "Our times," Dewey said, are char-
acterized by a "corrosive 'materialism'," which "springs from the 
notion, sedulously cultivated by the class in power, that the crea-
tive capacities of individuals can be evoked and developed only 
in a struggle for material possessions and material gain. "29 
Moreover, Dewey argued insistently, part of the reason for 
people's preoccupation with material gain is that many of them 
are still wanting in the basic necessities of life. Dewey believed 
that the chance to make progress toward the democratic ideal 
will be "lost for a considerable period" if we are not willing to 
"socialize the forces of production ... so that the liberty of indi-
viduals will be supported by the very structure of economic or-
ganization."30 For "liberation of the capacities of individuals for 
free, self-initiated expression is an essential part of the creed of 
liberalism" and to achieve this end, liberalism must adopt coop-
erative means; socialized economy is necessary.31 Laissez-faire 
individualism hindered progress toward the democratic ideal by 
mistaking progress in technological control over the physical en-
vironment for progress in freedom: 
It failed to see that the great expansion which was occurring 
[in industrialization) was in fact due to release of physical en-
ergies; that as far as human action and human freedom is con-
cerned, a problem, not a solution, was thereby instituted: the 
problem, namely, of management and direction of the new 
physical energies so they would contribute to realization of 
human possibilities.32 
In sum, the task for liberalism, the task for progress toward 
ideal democracy, is to apply the method of experimental intelli-
gence, not dogma or a priori broad generalizations.33 "(U]ntil 
28. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action at 47 (cited in note 17). 
29. Id. at 89. 
30. ld. at 88. 
31. Regimentation of material and mechanical forces is the only way by which 
the mass of individuals can be released from regimentation and consequent sup-
pression of their cultural possibilities. . . . Earlier liberalism regarded the sepa-
rate and competing economic action of individuals as the means to social well-
being as the end. We must reverse the perspective and see that socialized econ-
omy is the means of free individual development as the end. 
ld. at 90. 
32. Dewey, Freedom and Culture at 128 (cited in note 14). 
33. Any monolithic theory of social action and social causation [e.g., Dewey's 
interpretation of orthodox Marxism] tends to have a ready-made answer for 
problems that present themselves. The wholesale character of this answer pre-
vents critical examination and discrimination of the particular facts involved in 
the actual problem. In consequence, it dictates a kind of ali-or-none practical 
activity, which in the end introduces new difficulties. 
ld. at 80. 
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the method of intelligence and experimental control is the rule in 
social relations and social direction," we will find "that the prob-
lem of social organization in behalf of human liberty and the 
flowering of human capacities is insoluble. "34 Like public choice 
theory, Dewey finds democracy-as-we-know-it to present a 
rather bleak picture. 
II. REFLECTIONS ON APPLYING SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD TO DEMOCRACY 
A. Puauc CHOICE AS SociAL SciENCE 
In fact, the problems Dewey observed with political democ-
racy in its nonideal state-as he saw it in his day and as we still 
see it today-resonate interestingly with the postulates of public 
choice theory. People are acting as isolated individuals, he says, 
as though intelligence were entirely atomistic; this correlates with 
the premise of methodological individualism. People are acting 
from self-regarding motives, he says; this correlates with the 
premise of "rational" welfare-maximization. Paralleling the 
premises of public choice theory, Dewey argues that in fact, as 
things stand in practice, the public is unorganized and uncommit-
ted, whereas interest groups wield power. Legislators are respon-
sible to interest groups and not the public. Burgeoning 
communications technology, rather than making real communi-
cation possible, increases the power to win votes by advertising 
and packaging. Voters are skeptical, apathetic, and underedu-
cated. The interest of politicians is in capturing and retaining of-
fice, not in engaging in deliberative democracy. 
Insofar as public choice theory is an attempt to apply genu-
ine scientific method to observing and understanding the particu-
lar facts of this situation, I am sure Dewey would approve. He 
would approve of the air public choice has of debunking tired old 
ideology with hard facts. Even if the picture is bleak, I imagine 
he'd say, if these are the facts, we should straightforwardly name 
them and disseminate them; we shouldn't take refuge in vague, 
self-deluding, high-minded rhetoric. 
Moreover, both the deductive and inductive strands of pub-
lic choice methodology might represent at least an early stage of 
an appropriate scientific attitude toward understanding political 
practice as we now know it. For such an appropriate scientific 
attitude, the crucial idea is to achieve a detailed, articulated un-
derstanding of the particular consequences of particular institu-
34. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action at 92-93 (cited in note 17). 
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tional forms and incentive structures as they exist in the real 
world. Both inductive research (painstaking empirical observa-
tion and data recordation) and deductive research (thoughtful 
formalization of variables and predicted results) are appropriate 
in the attempt to create such a detailed understanding. 
B. REIFICATION: MISTAKING CONTINGENT CONDITIONS FOR 
FouNDATIONAL PREMISES 
Though I believe Dewey might find the meticulous dissec-
tion of institutional workings a plus of public choice theory, I 
believe he would also find its tendency to reify its behavioral 
premises a significant minus. To repeat what I pointed out 
above, Dewey's observations about political democracy in its cur-
rent nonideal state resonate interestingly with the postulates of 
public choice theory: isolated individuals acting from self-regard-
ing motives, an organized and uncommitted public, power 
wielded by interest groups, politicians motivated by seeking and 
keeping office. A Deweyan critique of public choice theory will, 
I believe, start by noticing the difference in epistemic status of 
these behavioral observations (and that is the reason I've itali-
cized portions of the comparative statement). 
The epistemic status of Dewey's observations about political 
democracy-as-we-know-it is contingent and relative. The charac-
teristic motivations and responses of political actors are mutable. 
They depend upon the particular historical events and circum-
stances that have brought us to where we are. The epistemic sta-
tus of the methodological and behavioral postulates of public 
choice theory is, on the other hand, more foundational. For the 
economic analyst, these are the "laws" of human nature. They 
are not relative to time and place; they are independent of his-
tory and culture.Js 
In other words, Dewey has a dynamic model of human be-
havior. Dewey thinks that we can change the sorry state of de-
mocracy-as-we-know-it, or at least he has faith that we can, and 
accordingly he argues that we must. In contrast, public choice 
theorists assume a static model of human behavior. On the 
whole, they don't think we can change the sorry state of democ-
racy-as-we-know-it. Some think we can manipulate it to some 
extent to achieve relatively better policy results in this nonideal 
35. On the difficulty engendered by the fact that these are postulates (presupposed) 
and also hypotheses (to be proved), see Frank I. Michelman, Reflections on ProfessioiUll 
Education, Legal Scholarship, and the Law-and-Economics Movement, 33 J. Legal Educ. 
197 (1983). 
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world, and some think, skeptically, that we can do no more than 
understand just how nonideal it is. 
I believe we can be confident that a Deweyan critique of 
public choice theory would begin by criticizing its reification of 
premises, because dislodging presupposed absolutes and turning 
them into contingent intellectual consequences is a consistent 
Deweyan theme. Dewey argued in many contexts that philo-
sophical premises taken to be absolute truths of human nature 
and the good are instead only the consequential reflections, in 
intellectual life, of the historical and cultural circumstances that 
gave them birth.36 In this vein, Dewey set out with some care 
what he took to be the historical origins of the foundational 
premises of liberalism. The premise of atomistic rights-bearing 
individuals he took to be the result of the need to throw off insti-
tutional ties, especially to the church, that hindered progress: 
Since it was necessary, upon the intellectual side, to find justi-
fication for the movements of revolt, and since established au-
thority was upon the side of institutional life, the natural 
recourse was appeal to some inalienable sacred authority resi-
dent in the protesting individuals. Thus 'individualism' was 
born, a theory which endowed singular persons in isolation 
from any associations, except those which they deliberately 
formed for their own ends, with native or natural rights. The 
revolt against old and limiting associations was converted, in-
tellectually, into the doctrine of independence of any and all 
associations.37 
There is nothing inherently logical or transcendently right about 
the philosophical doctrines of individualism, Dewey continues. 
Had circumstances been otherwise, had the problems facing the 
beginning of the industrial era been other than they were, so 
would our philosophical commitments have been different: 
36. This is the main argument of Reconstruction in Philosophy. For example: 
The actual conditions of life in Greece, particularly in Athens, when classic Eu-
ropean philosophy was formulated, set up a sharp division between doing and 
knowing, which was generalized into a complete separation of theory and "prac-
tice." It reftected, at the time, the economic organization in which "useful" 
work was done for the most part by slaves, leaving free men relieved from labor 
and "free" on that account. 
John C. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy ix-x (Beacon Press, 1948). Philosophers 
took this separation to be foundational rather than contingent, and presupposed rather 
than consequential, and so "retained the separation of theory and practice long after t~ls 
and processes derived from industrial operations had become indispensable resources m 
conducting the observations and experiments that are the heart of scientific knowing." 
ld. at x. 
37. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems at 86-87 (cited in note 3). 
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It is now easy for the imagination to conceive circumstances 
under which revolts against prior governmental forms would 
have found its theoretical formulation in an assertion of the 
rights of groups, of other associations than those of a political 
nature. There was no logic which rendered necessary the ap-
peal to the individual as an independent and isolated be-
ing. . . . But, as we have already remarked, the obnoxious 
state was closely bound up in fact and in tradition with other 
associations, ecclesiastic (and through its influence with the 
family), and economic ... The easiest way out was to go back 
to the naked individual, to sweep away all associations as for-
eign to his nature and rights save as they proceeded from his 
own voluntary choice, and guaranteed his own private ends.3s 
549 
An analogous Deweyan critique applies to economic analy-
sis, as represented by Bentham. Dewey admired Bentham for his 
view that "all organized action is to be judged by its conse-
quences,"39 for his rejection of natural rights and of "Reason [as] 
a remote majestic power that discloses ultimate truths,"40 and for 
his fertile invention of detailed legal and administrative devices 
designed, in a scientific spirit, to remedy specific evils and 
abuses.4t Dewey calls Bentham "the first great muck-raker in 
the field of law."42 Nevertheless, it was naive to suppose that the 
nature of man, everywhere and anywhere, was that of a mercan-
tile reckoner, just because the circumstances of the rising mer-
cantile society brought forth these characteristics. 
Dewey's judgment on Bentham and on liberalism in general 
turns on the usefulness-the consequences-of these ideas. And 
though the reformist zeal and meticulous systematic attention to 
consequences of Bentham and his followers had positive social 
consequences, so the liberals' naivete about the foundational sta-
tus of their premises was not without harmful consequences. On 
the plus side, Dewey says that "in spite of fundamental defects in 
his underlying theory of human nature,"43 "[t]he history of the 
legal and administrative changes in Great Britain during the first 
half of the nineteenth century is chiefly the history of Bentham 
and his school. "44 This is "proof that liberalism can be a power in 
bringing about radical social changes," when (as Bentham did) it 
38. Id. at 87-88. Cf. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action at 40-41 (criticizing Mill 
for this premise) (cited in note 17). 
39. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action at 16 (cited in note 17). 
40. ld. at 20. 
41. ld. at 14. 
42. ld. 
43. Id. at 15. 
44. Id. 
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"combine[s] capacity for bold and comprehensive social inven-
tion with detailed study of particulars and with courage in 
action." 45 
But, on the minus side, the ultimate consequence of liber-
alism's reification of individualism was tragic. Liberals "put for-
ward their ideas as immutable truths good at all times and places; 
they had no idea of historic relativity, either in general or in its 
application to themselves."46 Liberals could not recognize that 
their interpretations of liberty, individuality and intelligence 
were historically conditioned, and were relevant only to their 
own time. By the middle of the nineteenth century, laissez-faire 
liberalism, rather than being a radical reform doctrine, provided 
the intellectual justification of the status quo. 
This intellectual justification carried over into court deci-
sions in which judges "destroy social legislation passed in the in-
terest of a real, instead of purely formal, liberty of contract."47 
The decisions of the Lochner era could have been deprived of 
their intellectual and moral support, Dewey says, if only liberals 
had appreciated the historic relativity of their own interpretation 
of the meaning of liberty, and thus had understood that new eco-
nomic and social conditions called for a new conception. "If the 
early liberals had put forth their special interpretation of liberty 
as something subject to historical relativity," Dewey says, "they 
would not have frozen it into a doctrine to be applied at all times 
under all social circumstances. "48 Had they not frozen it in this 
way, bad consequences (to be discussed shortly) might have been 
avoided. 
I think Dewey would say that public choice theory, two gen-
erations after he wrote these words, is still clinging to reifications; 
and I think he would say that these reifications also tend toward 
bad consequences. 
Public choice theory reifies a Hobbesian conception of 
human nature. The individual of public choice theory is the 
Hobbesian mechanistic self-interest maximizer in a laissez-faire 
market. This model was called forth by historical circumstances 
that no longer obtain, among them the need to undermine the 
divine right of kings.49 Moreover, public choice theory also re-
ifies the notion that all these atomistic individuals have "prefer-
45. ld. 
46. Id. at 32. 
47. Id. at 33. 
48. ld. at 34. 
49. See Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory (U. of Chi. Press, 
1989). 
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ences" that they are trying to satisfy, and that these 
"preferences" are independent of the "preferences" of others. 
This model may be adequate for the purest of market interac-
tions but is obfuscatory when it comes to other kinds of human 
interactions. In democracy-as-we-know-it, with imperfect free-
dom and undeveloped intelligence, people's behavior largely fol-
lows habit and custom (as Dewey recognized) rather than the 
method of intelligence, and thus, in democracy-as-we-know-it, 
the public choice model of striving to satisfy preferences, without 
questioning how we came by them, may approximate social real-
ity; but, Dewey might say, that is no reason to freeze the model 
and call it eternal human nature. 
Finally, public choice theory also reifies the means/ends di-
chotomy. Economic analysis takes it to be foundational that peo-
ple engage in social activities only instrumentally, as a means 
toward the end of achieving maximum satisfaction of their self-
interested preferences. Again, while it may be true that under 
current conditions many people engage in political activities 
purely instrumentally with regard to their own self-interested 
goals, this need not necessarily be the case. Moreover, I think 
Dewey would also say, even in democracy-as-we-know-it, the 
rigid means/ends dichotomy misdescribes how people act and un-
derstand their actions. Every end is also a means to some other 
end; no action is purely a means, and no end is purely an end.so 
C. A DEWEYAN CRITIQUE OF NoN-NORMATIVITY 
Having argued that the premises of economic analysis are 
reifications, I believe a Deweyan critique would go on to say that 
these reifications are not only intellectually wrong; they may 
cause real pain for real people. By analogy, in Dewey's critique 
of the reifications of liberalism, he argued that if only liberals had 
not frozen their historically contingent conceptions of liberty and 
intelligence into immutable, transcendental laws, 
they would have recognized that effective liberty is a function 
of the social conditions existing at any time. If they had done 
this, they would have known that as economic relations be-
came dominantly controlling forces in setting the pattern of 
human relations, the necessity of liberty for individuals which 
they proclaimed will require social control of economic forces 
in the interest of the great mass of individuals. 
50. Dewey, Experience and Nature (cited in note 11). 
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This failure of liberalism was a tragedy for human beings and for 
their social progress: 
Because the liberals failed to make a distinction between 
purely formal or legal liberty and effective liberty of thought 
and action, the history of the last one hundred years is the 
history of non-fulfillment of their predictions.st 
Public choice theorists (at least outside of law schools) tend 
to be resolutely non-normative; for the most part they do not put 
forth their work primarily as a basis for policy recommendations. 
In contrast, the point of Dewey's insistence on a scientific atti-
tude toward understanding the consequences of various social 
practices and institutional designs was that only with such an un-
derstanding can we hope to be more than hit-or-miss at achieving 
the policy results we desire. For Dewey, policy results are the 
point. It is not enough to understand the world as it is; the point 
is to change it. Knowledge is valuable not for its own sake but for 
its use in improving the lives of all human beings. The reason for 
acquiring an accurate understanding of the world, in ever in-
creasing detail and capabilities for control of consequences, is so 
that we can change the world for the better. 
Thus I believe Dewey would object to the resolute non-
normativity of pure public choice theory. Even retaining there-
ified premises of economics, one could still adopt the stance 
Dewey praised in Bentham: one could concentrate on using the 
information to improve nonideal democracy. We could use it to 
make new institutions, or revise old ones, given the premises of 
economic man. If the findings of public choice theorists represent 
scientific facts and causal linkages, it may be argued that their 
findings can be the backdrop of policy choices exactly as Dewey 
envisioned. For example, we might avoid structuring regulatory 
commissions in such a way that the members hold tenure at the 
will of one legislator. That structure tends to result in decisions in 
favor of whatever applicants give the most money to that legisla-
tor's campaign fund, because the legislator will fire any commis-
sioner who doesn't behave this way.s2 One of the big pluses of 
public choice theory, from this point of view, is that it can tell us 
which forms of institutional design ought to be avoided because 
they are most vulnerable to corruption. 
51. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action at 34-35 (cited in note 17). 
52. The history of the California Coastal Commission is an example. Barbara Baird, 
Blueprint for Malibu, L.A. Times 1 (Aug. 2, 1987). 
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Does this mean, then, that Dewey would approve of the 
right-wing agenda of much law-and-economics scholarship? Af-
ter all, we can hardly fail to notice that the impact of public 
choice theory on the legal world is not non-normative at all. 
Lawyers and judges who admire this kind of scholarship tend to 
want to consider economic regulation as rent-seeking,s3 and 
hence tend to want to implement laissez-faire markets,s4 and 
even tend to want to bring back Lochner.ss 
I believe Dewey would approve of any insights public choice 
can give us into designing institutions to avoid corruption, given 
the nonideal state of democracy-as-we-know-it. Yet it seems 
clear he would deplore the broader law-and-economics agenda. 
Lochner-like reasoning would not seem any better to him now 
than it did in its first flowering. The reason he would deplore it, 
again, is that this agenda just deepens the reification of the out-
moded conceptions of liberal individualism. Thus, I believe 
Dewey would want to find a way to explore scientifically how we 
can change these premises-make them less true of us-so that 
we can get closer to ideal democracy. 
D. SciENCE AND DEMOCRACY (To BE CONTINUED) 
Public choice theory is praiseworthy insofar as it seeks scien-
tific facts about democracy-as-we-know-it, looking to intricate 
causal relationships between institutional design and political 
consequences, and insofar as it eschews soothing rhetoric in favor 
of "telling it like it is." Public choice theory falls far short of 
Dewey's vision for the method of democracy, however, because 
it reifies its premises, and is thus largely disabled from using its 
accumulated knowledge to make progress toward ideal democ-
racy. Although we could use public choice theory to redesign in-
stitutions in light of its cynical premises (in the manner of 
Bentham), we can't use it to make progress toward ideal democ-
racy, because of the reification of its cynical premises. 
53. See NoUan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (Scalia, J.). See 
also Mark Kelman, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: On Democracy-Bashing: 
A Skeptical Lcok at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Move· 
ment, 74 Va. L. Rev. 199 (1988); Margaret Jane Radin, Symposium, Richard Epstein's 
Takings: Private Propeny and the Power of Eminent Domain: The Consequences of Con· 
ceptualism, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 239 (1986}. 
54. Unless perhaps, the laissez-faire market doesn't yield the ideological results they 
prefer; see, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473 (1991). 
55. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Propeny, ch. VI (U. of Chi. Press, 
1993). 
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What would a democratic theory more satisfactory to 
Dewey now look like? I believe it would have to incorporate all 
the tools of public choice theory for detailing the sad state of 
democracy-as-we-know-it, but in addition, it would have to have 
two other salient features: (1) it would not reify human nature 
as-we-know-it, nor any of the conceptions of human motivations 
as-we-know-them that drive the machinery of democracy-as-we-
know-it; (2) it would try to theorize how the method of intelli-
gence, suitably construed, can be used to push nonideal democ-
racy toward ideal democracy. 
In constructing the method of intelligence, the Deweyan sci-
entific attitude, I believe Dewey would wish to heal the modem 
split between "science" and the "humanities." He would caution 
us, I believe, to avoid the overidentification of science with 
number-crunching. Dewey would not equate rationality with 
quantification. He would not suggest that the scientific attitude 
in social value choices means we should regard everything 
human beings value as commensurable, so that they can all be 
weighed in a giant cost-benefit analysis. At the same time he 
would also caution us, I believe, against glorifying the irrational 
in ethics and cultural studies. He would not give up on the idea 
of a knowing subject in the context of other knowing subjects, 
and he would not give up on the idea of progress. For a Deweyan 
pragmatist, deconstructive work is important, but it cannot dis-
place reconstructive work. Both criticism (of the nonideal) and 
vision (of the ideal) are necessary.s6 
What can be accomplished if we both reconstruct the 
method of intelligence and take care not to reify human nature? 
We will understand that human nature will change as culture 
changes, and, in tum, that culture will change as human nature 
changes. This suggests that, if we want to apply scientific knowl-
edge and imagination to the problem in a Deweyan spirit, what 
we need is a modem evolutionary model-that is, a dynamic sys-
tems model designed to take account of feedback. These models 
are being developed in evolutionary biology and other branches 
of modem science. I imagine that Dewey would hope-just as 
he hoped with earlier scientific models-that these intellectual 
discoveries might also be applied to the study of culture and its 
complex of interlocking variables. 
56. See Margaret Jane Radin and Frank I. Michelman, Symposium: The Critique of 
Normativity: Commentary: Pragmatist and Postructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1019 (1991). 
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At least at this point we can name the variables; it's clearer 
to us than it was in Dewey's time that they interlock, that they 
can be characterized as forming a complex feedback system. 
Culture and material conditions interact with each other. In par-
ticular the scientific attitude that Dewey commends needs to be 
created by culture; the ability to create it presupposes certain ma-
terial conditions, and once we have created it, it will operate to 
change material conditions. The ability to create it also presup-
poses certain commitments and self-understandings. Culture and 
people's commitments and self-understandings-their "human 
nature," their "preferences" -also interact with each other. 
These self-understandings evolve in response to changes in cul-
ture; they also change the culture. Culture and the law also inter-
act with each other. The law both expresses and works to form 
and evolve cultural commitments and characteristics. 
People's commitments and self-understandings also interact 
with the law. "Preferences" bring law into being, but law also 
makes and changes "preferences." Because public choice defines 
this particular feedback loop out of existence, it is much too 
crude; it is retarded science at best. Dewey would want us to ask 
a question that public choice is not formulated to ask, because it 
is a question about feedback. Here's the question: If we conceive 
of democracy solely in terms of rent-seeking self-interested 
profit-maximizers ceaselessly seeking rent while trying to avoid 
free-riders and holdouts, what does this conceptual scheme do to 
our culture? What does it do to our selves? 
Because these variables-law, culture, human nature, mate-
rial conditions-are involved in interlocking feedback relation-
ships, it is easy to mistake cause for effect. It's not true, for 
example, that law always "causes" cultural shifts, but neither is it 
true that law always merely is a "consequence" of culture. So 
Dewey's exhortation that we try to become ever more sophisti-
cated in our understanding of consequences, if we want to im-
prove society and democracy, is difficult to fulfill. It might be 
that the practice of conceiving of politics in market rhetoric is 
actively bringing about in us those very motivations and charac-
teristics it presupposes and reifies. The more we suppose that 
government consists of politicians lining their own pockets or 
those of their supporters, the more it is so, perhaps. The more 
we conceive of all things people value as mere preferences that 
can be expressed in dollars and traded off against other dollar-
values, the more it is so, perhaps. Presupposing a model of com-
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modification in politics perhaps helps to create a commodified 
world. 
Formal tools have been developed for studying feedback 
mechanisms in nature, in ecological systems and evolutionary bi-
ology. With sensitive dependence of result on initial conditions, 
some systems are unpredictable ("chaotic"), but large-scale reit-
erative feedback experiments on computers are capable of show-
ing us which ones those are, and which ones eventually fall into a 
predictable pattern or range. What would an analogous experi-
ment look like for the set of feedback variables on which ideal 
democracy depends? This is a question I can't answer, but if 
John Dewey were here today, I believe he would be asking it. 
